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Collectivism and the Costs of High Leverage  
 
 
Abstract 
Prior literature shows that high leverage is associated with losses in market share due to 
unfavorable actions by customers and competitors. Building on this literature, we investigate the 
effect of collectivism on the product market performance of highly leveraged firms. Using a 
sample of 46 countries over the 1989–2016 period, we find significantly lower costs of high 
leverage for countries with higher collectivism scores. Moreover, we find that the impact of 
collectivism on high leverage costs is more pronounced for firms with high product specialization 
and with financially healthy rivals. In additional analysis, we find that collectivism helps highly 
leveraged firms retain employees and obtain trade credit from suppliers. Our findings thus suggest 
that a country’s culture affects corporate financial outcomes by influencing the actions of firm 
stakeholders. 
 
Key Words: Collectivism; National Culture; Costs of High Leverage; Stakeholder Theory; 
Predation Theory 
JEL Classification: G32 
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1. Introduction 
Prior literature on capital structure and product market interactions suggests that high leverage 
leads to substantial stakeholder-induced deadweight costs that adversely affect firm product 
market performance.1,2 First, high leverage can lead to lower sales (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; 
Titman, 1984), as customers anticipate that the firm will face strong incentives to cut costs (e.g., 
by reneging on warranties or reducing product quality). High leverage can therefore lead to a 
customer-driven loss of market share. Second, high leverage can lead to predatory attacks from 
competitors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Opler and Titman, 1994; Chevalier, 1995) and thus to 
a competitor-driven loss of market share. In this paper we extend the literature on the costs of high 
leverage to a cross-country setting and examine the role of national culture on the link between 
capital structure and product market performance. 
Culture refers to the “unwritten codes of conduct” (North, 1990, p. 4) that guide decisions and 
behaviors in a country. We focus on the role of Hofstede’s (2001) collectivism/individualism 
dimension of culture3 as this dimension is a fundamental driver of differences across countries 
                                                             
1 Following Freeman (1984), we define stakeholders as those entities that affect or are affected by a firm’s 
decisions. This definition includes entities that have implicit or explicit contracts with the firm, such as 
customers, suppliers, and employees, as well as those that have no contracting relation with the firm but 
nonetheless influence the firm, such as competitors. 
2 The literature identifies two types of high leverage costs: 1) agency costs of high leverage, the costs of 
underinvestment and risk-shifting (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977), and 2) stakeholder-related 
costs of high leverage, the costs of unfavorable stakeholder actions. In this paper we follow the framework 
of Campello (2006) and examine the effect of culture on the second type of high leverage costs. 
3 In our analysis, we control for the effects of Hofstede’s (2001) other dimensions of national culture, 
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(Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 2001) and, as we argue below, has a theoretical link to 
high leverage. In individualist countries, agents tend to emphasize the individual’s needs over the 
collective interest (Miller, 1994), to exhibit overconfidence (Gelfand et al., 2002; Heine et al., 
1999; Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Odean, 1998), and to respond more to calculative than moral 
incentives (Etzioni, 1975; Hofstede, 2001). In collectivist countries, in contrast, agents tend to 
suppress their inner attributes, avoid standing out, and are more morally driven. 
Building on the theory of incomplete contracts, we argue that under the condition of high 
leverage, the coordination function of formal institutions is less efficient and thus the informal 
constraints of culture can play a more important role in affecting firm outcomes. First, because a 
highly leveraged firm has incentives to cut costs by reneging on its implicit contracts with 
customers, and these implicit contracts have little legal standing, customers avoid making 
purchases from highly leveraged firms. We expect collectivism to reduce these customer-driven 
costs of high leverage by constraining opportunism on the part of highly leveraged firms, as 
reneging on implicit contracts with customers may be perceived as immoral. In addition, to the 
extent that customers in collectivist countries are more willing to support firm survival, they may 
be more patient with highly leveraged firms struggling to meet their obligations in difficult times. 
Second, because imperfect financing contracts limit the ability of highly leveraged firms to raise 
external funds, these firms’ competitors have incentives to take predatory actions against the firm. 
We expect collectivism to reduce these competitor-driven costs of high leverage by constraining 
opportunism on the part of highly leveraged firms’ competitors, as preying on weak firms may be 
perceived as unethical. In addition, to the extent that firms in collectivist countries exhibit less 
                                                             
namely, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, and power distance.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007493 
3 
 
overconfidence bias, they may engage in less predatory behavior as investments in this strategy 
can yield negative returns if they fail to drive the highly leveraged firm out of the market. 
To empirically examine the role of collectivism on the costs of high leverage, we employ 
Hofstede’s (2001) widely used collectivism/individualism index and we capture the costs of high 
leverage by regressing industry-adjusted sales growth, a measure of a ﬁrm’s growth in market 
share, on a high-leverage dummy. In our primary analysis we follow Campello (2006) and set the 
high-leverage dummy to one if in a given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three 
deciles in the country in which the firm is headquartered. A more negative coefficient on the high-
leverage dummy would indicate more adverse actions from customers and competitors and thus 
greater costs associated with high leverage. 4  Using a large sample of 241,906 firm-year 
observations from 46 countries over the 1989–2016 period, we document significantly lower costs 
of high leverage in countries with higher collectivism scores. 
To address the sensitivity of our result to using the three-decile cutoff in constructing the high-
leverage dummy, we rerun our main analysis following Opler and Titman (1994) and set the high-
leverage dummy to one for top-decile leverage observations and zero for bottom-decile 
observations. Using this more extreme proxy for high-leverage firms, we continue to find 
significantly lower costs of high leverage in countries with higher collectivism scores. 
Next, we examine whether the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage is greater 
for firms likely to face more severe costs of high leverage, namely, firms that produce highly 
specialized products (i.e., whose customers would suffer more from firm losses and thus respond 
more negatively to high leverage) and firms in low-debt industries (i.e., whose competitors have 
                                                             
4  Positive (negative) industry-adjusted sales growth implies that the firm’s market share is increasing 
(decreasing). 
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greater financial ability to prey on a highly leveraged firm). We find that the effect of collectivism 
on high leverage costs is more pronounced for firms with high product specialization and for firms 
with financially healthy rivals, that is, firms likely to experience more severe costs of high leverage. 
To shed additional light on the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs, we employ the 
framework of Opler and Titman (1994) and study the product market performance of a group of 
firms with high ex-ante leverage in industry downturns. The results suggest that collectivism 
further reduces the costs of high leverage in periods of industry distress. We also conduct a two-
step estimation procedure that helps disentangle the influence of culture from that of other country-
level characteristics. We find that the effect of collectivism continues to hold after controlling for 
other dimensions of national culture, as well as for variables related to a country’s economic, legal, 
and political environments. These results lend further support to the view that collectivism reduces 
the costs of high leverage. 
In robustness tests, we use firm fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant firm 
characteristics and we use propensity score matching to address self-selection into high leverage. 
In addition, we address concerns related to an unbalanced sample, variable measurement, and 
alternative explanations. The negative relation between collectivism and high leverage costs 
remains unchanged. 
We conduct two sets of additional analyses. First, we consider whether the mitigating effect 
of collectivism on high leverage costs also works through stakeholder groups other than customers 
and competitors, in particular, through suppliers and employees (Titman, 1984). We find that both 
supplier- and employee-driven leverage costs are significant and that the beneficial role of 
collectivism extends to both of these channels. Moreover, the effect of collectivism is more 
pronounced for firms that lack employee or supplier relation policies, which suggests that 
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employees and suppliers may act more aggressively towards these firms. These results together 
with our main evidence suggest that collectivism mitigates the costs of high leverage by 
influencing the behaviors of various stakeholders—not only customers and competitors, but also 
employees and suppliers. Second, we consider the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs in 
countries with weak formal institutions, that is, in countries where contracts cannot efficiently 
regulate the behaviors of market participants. We find that in these countries, collectivism exerts 
greater influence on the costs of high leverage. This finding suggests that culture plays a more 
important role than formal institutions in influencing the product market performance of highly 
leveraged firms. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on culture and finance (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, 2008; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010; Shao, Kwok, and Guedhami, 2010; Gorodnichenko 
and Roland, 2011; Eun, Wang, and Xiao, 2015; Karolyi, 2016; Griffin et al., 2017). Prior studies 
suggest that culture shapes firms’ outcomes by influencing investors’ and managers’ subjective 
perceptions and behaviors. For example, trust affects perceptions of the risk of being cheated and 
in turn stock market participation decisions (Guiso et al., 2008); overconfidence and self-
attribution biases lead to the use of momentum trading strategies (Chui et al., 2010); an emphasis 
on not deviating from others’ behaviors leads to similar trading patterns and hence higher stock 
return co-movement (Eun et al., 2015); and conservativism conditions managers to be self-
disciplined, reducing the need for leverage as a disciplinary device (Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002; 
El Ghoul et al., 2018). Our findings extend this literature by showing that in addition to affecting 
firm outcomes by conditioning investors’ and managers’ behavior, culture imposes informal 
constraints on the behaviors of suppliers, customers, competitors, and employees.5 Thus, our 
                                                             
5  This result is consistent with Maksimovic (1995), who argues that firms’ financial outcomes are 
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analysis of the interactions between capital structure and product market performance sheds new 
light on the role of national culture in conditioning the behavior of key firm stakeholder groups. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on capital structure and product market 
performance. Prior studies focus largely on the consequences of high leverage, with little attention 
paid to the factors that mitigate high leverage costs. An exception is Bae et al. (2019), who find 
that for a sample of U.S. firms corporate social responsibility alleviates customer dissatisfaction 
and competitor predation associated with high leverage. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the 
first international study to show that the informal constraints associated with culture also influence 
the costs of high leverage. Our findings suggest that by affecting the interactions between a firm 
and its key stakeholders, national culture as captured by collectivism/individualism mitigates the 
costs of high leverage.  
Finally, our paper adds to the literature on the costs of high leverage (e.g., Opler and Titman, 
1994; Campello, 2003, 2006; El Ghoul et al., 2019) by documenting the costs driven by various 
stakeholder groups. Extant research focuses largely on the behavior of highly levered firms’ 
customers (e.g., Matsa, 2011; Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam, 2017) and competitors (e.g., Bolton 
and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 1995). Our study provides the first empirical analysis of the 
behavior of not only these commonly studied stakeholder groups but also other relatively 
overlooked stakeholders (i.e., employees and suppliers).6 
                                                             
influenced by various stakeholder groups. 
6 One notable exception is Cohn and Wardlaw (2016), who find higher employee injury rates with increased 
leverage. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our sample and variables. 
Section 3 presents results of our empirical analysis on the relation between collectivism and the 
costs of high leverage. Section 4 concludes the paper.  
2. Sample and variables 
2.1. Sample construction 
To examine the impact of culture on the costs of high leverage, we compile data from six 
sources: 1) Compustat, which we use to construct firm-level financial variables; 2) Hofstede 
(2001), which we use to obtain cultural indices; 3) the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database, which we use to construct country-level economic development variables; 4) Djankov 
et al. (2008), which we use to obtain a country’s revised anti-director rights index; 5) International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which we use to obtain a country’s law and order index; and 6) Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), which we use to construct a country’s legal 
system and property rights index. 
To construct the sample, we start with Compustat North America and Global for the period 
1987–2016. We exclude firm-year observations with negative total assets and sales, missing equity, 
or long-term debt-to-assets less (greater) than zero (one). We also omit firm-years with asset 
growth or sales growth greater than 200% to control for outliers. Following prior research, we 
further remove financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) and utilities (SIC codes 
between 4900 and 4999). We classify industries according to Campbell (1996). To further ensure 
that our industry or country means are not biased by outliers, we require each country-industry-
year to have no fewer than four observations and each country to have no fewer than ten 
observations. These filters lead to an initial sample of 492,402 observations that represent 40,906 
unique firms from 77 countries. We next merge this sample with Hofstede’s (2001) cultural indices, 
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WDI, Djankov et al. (2008), ICRG, and EFW to obtain our main explanatory variables. We exclude 
firm-years with missing values for variables used in the main regression. The final sample 
comprises an unbalanced panel of 241,906 observations representing 29,068 firms from 46 
countries over the period 1989–2016.  
2.2. Measuring national culture 
Our measure of national culture comes from Hofstede (2001), whose framework is arguably 
the most influential of the various cultural classifications in cross-cultural research (Kirkman, 
Lowe, and Gibson, 2006) and is employed extensively in prior finance studies (e.g., Chui et al., 
2010; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011; Eun et al., 2015). As we discuss above, we employ 
Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism index (IDV) as our main measure of national culture. This 
index, which captures the strength of ties among people in a community, is based on a survey of 
IBM employees that asked them to rate their 1) work-life balance, 2) physical work environment 
(good ventilation and lighting, adequate workspace, etc.), 3) job security, and 4) degree of variety 
and adventure on the job. Higher ratings in areas 1) and 4) and lower ratings in areas 2) and 3) 
suggest higher individualism (lower collectivism). For ease of interpretation, we construct 
collectivism (COL) as an index equal to (100 – IDV). In additional analysis, we also examine 
Hofstede’s (2001) three other cultural dimensions, namely, uncertainty avoidance (UAI), 
masculinity (MAS), and power distance (PDI). Detailed variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix A. 
2.3. Measuring the costs of high leverage 
Campello (2006) finds a negative relation between high leverage and relative-to-rival sales 
growth.7 We extend Campello’s (2006) model to measure the costs of high leverage in a cross-
                                                             
7 Campello’s (2006) main model, which is used to test for a non-monotonic relation between leverage and 
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country setting. Specifically, we estimate the following specification:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆0 + 𝜆𝜆1𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜆𝜆2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜆𝜆3𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1+ �𝜆𝜆4𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝜆𝜆5𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝜆𝜆6𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐+ 𝜆𝜆7𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜆𝜆8𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+𝜆𝜆9𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ,     (1) 
where i, c, and t index firms, countries, and years, respectively. Our outcome variable, SALES_G, 
captures both the purchasing behavior of customers and the predation behavior of competitors. We 
expect a decrease in sales growth if customers choose not to purchase from a highly leveraged firm 
or if competitors attempt to take over the market share of the highly leveraged firm. Our measure 
of high leverage, HLEV, is a dummy variable equal to one in a given year if the firm’s long-term 
debt ratio is in the top three deciles in the country in which the firm is headquartered. A positive 
coefficient on HLEV (𝜆𝜆1) indicates higher sales growth for the highly leveraged firm thus lower 
costs of high leverage.8 
                                                             
sales growth, is not our focus. Rather, because we are interested in the effect of high leverage, we use the 
model in Campello (2006) that revisits the work of Opler and Titman (1994). 
8 One might ask why a firm would choose to have high leverage if high leverage is costly. With this in mind, 
we follow prior research (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994) and assume that otherwise-identical firms choose 
different leverage ratios. This assumption is motivated by Maksimovic and Zechner (1991), who argue that 
firms in the same industry are indifferent between a high-leverage/high-risk strategy and a low-
leverage/low-risk strategy, and by Opler and Titman (1994), who argue that otherwise-identical firms may 
simultaneously choose a high-leverage/tax-advantage strategy and a low-leverage/cheap-assets-acquisition 
strategy during industry downturns. This assumption also finds empirical support in our propensity score 
matching analysis, where we match each high-leverage firm to a low-leverage firm that shares similar 
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Note that if firms anticipate greater costs of high leverage, they may adjust their debt financing 
downward. In this case, reverse causality problems could arise. Two features of our model mitigate 
this concern. First, since firms can more readily adjust short-term debt compared to long-term debt, 
we rely only on the long-term debt ratio when calculating HLEV (following Campello, 2006). 
Second, HLEV is lagged two years relative to the year in which SALES_G is measured (the base 
year), which implies that debt adjustment in response to firm performance is less likely to take 
place.  
Our choice of the firm-level control variables is motivated by Campello (2006). Specifically, 
we control for firm size (SIZE), the natural logarithm of total assets; profitability (PROFIT), 
operating earnings plus depreciation divided by total assets; investment (INVESTMENT), capital 
expenditures over total assets; and selling expenses (SELLEXP), the ratio of advertising and selling 
expenses to total sales. At the country level, we include a developed country indicator 
(DEVELOPED), GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INFLATION), as well as the strength of a 
country’s legal regime (LEGAL) to account for potential macroeconomic influences.  
Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use 
the relative measurement method when calculating the firm-level variables in Equation (1). 
Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers,9 and the other firm-level 
                                                             
characteristics. To preview the results, HLEV continues to load significantly negatively on SALES_G with 
an impact of similar magnitude. 
9  Employing the relative measurement method to measure HLEV mitigates concerns about a high 
correlation between collectivism and leverage (Chui et al., 2002), the two components of the interaction 
term discussed in Section 3.1.1. As Table 1, Panel A suggests, for each country around 30% of firm-year 
observations are highly levered, which means that country-level variables such as collectivism are not likely 
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variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. This method accounts for 
the fact that firm-level variables are determined in part by peer performance or financial condition. 
Since peer performance is beyond a given firm’s control, relative-to-peer variables are less subject 
to endogeneity (Campello, 2003, 2006). To control for the influence of outliers, we winsorize 
PROFIT, INVESTMENT, and SELLEXP at the 1% and 99% levels. 
2.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables used in our analysis (before 
country-industry-year adjustment) by country (Panel A) and for the full sample (Panel B). The 
sample distribution in Panel A exhibits a fair amount of variation. Similar to other cross-country 
studies, we find that the U.S. and Japan account for the largest percentage of firm-year observations 
(22.9% and 15.2%, respectively); in robustness tests we show that this unbalanced sample does 
not drive our main findings. Table 1, Panel C presents pairwise correlation coefficients between 
the variables used in our analysis. We find that the correlations between the variables are relatively 
low, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in our tests. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
3. Empirical analysis  
Building on extant literature, in Section 3.1 we conduct our main analysis on the effects of 
collectivism on customer- and competitor-driven costs of high leverage, and we provide additional 
evidence based on the framework of Opler and Titman (1994) and a two-step estimation approach. 
                                                             
to significantly influence HLEV. Consistent with this view, Table 1, Panel C shows that the correlation 
between COL and HLEV is minimal (0.01). 
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In Section 3.2 we present results of robustness checks. In additional analyses in Section 3.3, we 
examine whether collectivism influences high leverage costs through employees and suppliers in 
addition to competitors and customers, and in Section 3.4, we examine whether the impact of 
collectivism is more pronounced in weak legal environments.  
3.1. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage 
3.1.1. Main analysis 
We start by measuring the costs of high leverage in a cross-country setting based on the 
framework of Campello (2006). Model 1 of Table 2 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) results 
for Equation (1). To mitigate concerns that observations from the same firm are autocorrelated 
across years, we cluster t-statistics at the firm level.10 We find that the high-leverage dummy 
(firm-years with a long-term debt ratio in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is 
headquartered) enters the regression with a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at 
                                                             
10 One could also adjust standard errors for clustering at the country level to account for within-country 
dependence. However, because of the relatively few countries in our sample and the few observations for 
some countries, clustering standard errors at the country level may suffer from the problem of “too few 
clusters”, which would lead to biased standard errors (Cameron and Miller, 2015; Petersen, 2009). 
Replicating our main analysis in Table 2 using standard errors clustered by country and by country and year 
yields lower significance levels. The results are reported in the Internet Appendix Tables IA1 and IA2. 
Because of the too few clusters problem, the results presented in Appendix Tables IA1 and IA2 are of 
questionable statistical validity, but are presented to give a sense of the potential relative impact of a more 
complex cross-firm, within-country correlated error structure. While the problem of too few clusters make 
exact inference impossible, the results give some confidence that our main results are not driven by a more 
complex underlying error structure. 
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the 1% level, which implies that high leverage is costly. The control variables exhibit significant 
coefficients that are consistent with our expectations: firm size, profitability, investment, and 
selling expenses are positively related to sales growth while the developed country indicator is 
negatively related to sales growth. 
To examine the effect of collectivism and other dimensions of national culture on the costs of 
high leverage, we first estimate Equation (1) for each country to obtain country-specific estimates 
of the costs of high leverage, 𝜆𝜆1 . Figure 1 plots the estimated costs of high leverage against 
collectivism. The upward-sloping regression line provides initial evidence that collectivism helps 
mitigate the costs of high leverage.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Next, we augment Equation (1) by adding COL and its interaction with HLEV. Specifically, 
we run the following model:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+ �𝛽𝛽5𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛽𝛽6𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛽𝛽7𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1+ 𝛽𝛽8𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝛽𝛽11𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽14𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐× 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 .     (2) 
Here we are interested in the coefficient on COL×HLEV, 𝛽𝛽1. If collectivism reduces the costs of 
high leverage as we predict, 𝛽𝛽1 should be positive and significant. To help distinguish the effect 
of collectivism on high leverage costs from the effects of other country characteristics, we control 
for the interactions between HLEV and the country-level variables DEVELOPED, GDPG, 
INFLATION, and LEGAL.  
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The results are reported in Model 2 of Table 2. We find a positive and significant coefficient 
on COL×HLEV. Economically, increasing collectivism from the first (e.g., Denmark) to the third 
(e.g., Mexico) quartile is associated with a 1.3% increase in highly leveraged firms’ relative-to-
industry sales growth two years later. This result is consistent with our prediction that the costs of 
high leverage are lower in collectivist countries. 
In Model 3 of Table 2, we examine whether our main evidence holds using a more extreme 
measure of high leverage. Recall that our main measure of high leverage is a dummy equal to one 
if a firm’s leverage ratio in a given year is in the top three deciles of the full sample. To address 
the concern that the three-decile cutoff might be arbitrary, we follow Opler and Titman (1994) and 
assign the value of one to top-decile leverage observations and zero to bottom-decile observations. 
Comparisons based on this definition are thus between extremely high-leveraged firms and 
extremely low-leveraged firms. We expect that under this more extreme definition of high leverage, 
the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs should be more pronounced. As can be seen in 
Model 3, extremely high-leveraged firms experience larger losses in market share, and the ability 
of collectivism to mitigate the losses associated with extremely high leverage is more pronounced 
(the coefficient on COL×HLEV is almost double that in the baseline model, going from 0.028 to 
0.041). This finding lends further support to our prediction that collectivism is associated with 
lower costs of high leverage.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
3.1.2. The effect of culture on the actions of customers and competitors 
Our main theoretical argument holds that in an incomplete contracts environment, 
collectivism allows highly leveraged firms to retain customers and protects highly leveraged firms 
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from the predatory actions of competitors. In Table 3 we examine whether the effect of collectivism 
on the costs of high leverage is more pronounced for firms whose customers and competitors are 
more sensitive to firms’ use of high leverage. 
Focusing first on customers, prior studies show that when customers purchase highly 
specialized products, they have more to lose if the firm fails to honor its implicit contracts (Opler 
and Titman, 1994). Because highly leveraged firms face strong incentives to renege on their 
implicit contracts, we therefore predict that customers are particularly likely to avoid purchasing 
from these firms. To proxy for the degree of product specialization, we use R&D expenditures 
(Titman and Wessels, 1988). A firm is classified as having high (low) product specialization if its 
R&D-to-sales ratio is above (below) the sample median two years before the base year. Models 2 
to 3 of Table 3 show that the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs is indeed stronger in the 
high-product-specialization subsample. Thus, consistent with our prediction, this finding suggests 
that the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs is more pronounced for firms that are likely 
to experience more adverse actions from customers (i.e., to suffer a larger customer-driven loss in 
market share).  
Turning to competitors, predation is more likely if competitors are financially healthy 
(Campello, 2003), as financially sound competitors can fund predatory activities (e.g., reduce 
prices) more easily. Following Campello (2003) and Campello and Fluck (2006), we employ the 
industry-average debt level to proxy for the financial condition of a firm’s competitors. In 
particular, we classify the industry peers of a highly leveraged firm as financially unhealthy 
(healthy) if the industry average long-term debt ratio is greater than (less than or equal to) the 
median of the overall sample two years before the base year. In Models 4 and 5 of Table 3 we find 
that the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs is stronger for industries with more aggressive 
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competitor predation, suggesting that competitor actions also drive our main results.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
To summarize, the results above show that the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs 
operates through firms’ customers and competitors. 
3.1.3. Additional evidence: Applying the framework of Opler and Titman (1994) 
To provide further evidence on our findings based on Campello’s (2006) framework, in this 
section we rely on the model of Opler and Titman (1994), which focuses on the product market 
performance of a group of firms with high ex-ante leverage in industry downturns. This model 
provides a natural experiment to test whether our main evidence holds after introducing an 
unexpected shock of industry distress. In addition, this model allows us to investigate the 
conditions under which different stakeholders have stronger reactions, which allows for a better 
understanding of the roles of customers and competitors in driving the costs of high leverage. We 
extend Opler and Titman’s (1994) evidence from the U.S. to an international setting by adding 
COL and country-level controls as follows:  
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 × 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝛿𝛿2𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 × 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+ 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿5𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝛿𝛿6𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿7𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝛿𝛿8𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆)𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿9𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿10𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝛿𝛿11𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿12𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿13𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐+ 𝛿𝛿14𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿15𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿16𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝛿𝛿17𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿18𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝛿19𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 .     (3) 
The variables SALES_G, COL, and HLEV are defined as in our baseline model (Table 2). We use 
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all firm- and industry-level controls from Opler and Titman (1994): INDUSTRY DISTRESS, a 
dummy set to one for industry-years with negative mean sales growth and mean stock returns 
below -30%; LOG(SALE), the natural logarithm of total sales; PROFITABILITY, operating 
earnings over total assets; INVESTMENT, capital expenditures over total assets; and ASSET SALE, 
asset sales over total assets. Similar to our baseline model, the firm-level variables are adjusted 
relative to their country-industry-year means. Our country-level controls follow the baseline model. 
Table 4, Model 1 reports the results from estimating Equation (3). We find that the coefficient 
on 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 × 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻  is significantly positive, which suggests that 
collectivism further reduces the costs of high leverage in periods of industry distress. This finding 
lends support to our main evidence based on Campello’s (2006) framework. Notice that this 
finding reflects the joint actions of customers and competitors. To understand the actions of each 
group separately, we follow the analysis in Table 3 and conduct subsample tests based on the 
degree of product specialization and the financial condition of the firm’s competitors. Similar to 
the arguments above, we expect the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage during 
periods of industry distress to be greater for firms that produce highly specialized products and for 
firms in low-debt industries. Models 2 and 3 of Table 4 show that the impact of collectivism on 
high leverage costs is statistically significant in the high-product-specialization (coef=0.793; t-
stat=1.97) and low-industry-debt (coef=1.104; t-stat=1.88) subsamples, but insignificant in the 
low-product-specialization (coef=0.309; t-stat=0.51) and high-industry-debt (coef=0.531; t-
stat=1.24) subsamples. These results further support our prediction that collectivism reduces high 
leverage costs by conditioning the actions of customers and competitors. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
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3.1.4. Additional evidence: Using two-step estimation11 
To better assess the role of culture and other country-level characteristics in influencing high 
leverage costs, we employ a two-step analysis. In the first step, each year we regress SALES_G on 
the interactions between HLEV and 46 separate country dummies, as well as on a set of controls. 
Specifically, we estimate the following regression: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜑𝜑0 + 𝜑𝜑1𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜑𝜑2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜑𝜑3𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1+ �𝜑𝜑4𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝜑𝜑5𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 ,     (4) 
where 𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 is a vector of country fixed effects. A positive coefficient on HLEV (𝜑𝜑1) indicates higher 
sales growth for the highly leveraged firm, hence lower costs of high leverage. This regression 
yields coefficients on the interactions of HLEV with the 46 country dummies in each year. Panel 
A of Table 5 reports the averages of these coefficients across the 46 countries, and Figure 2 plots 
them against collectivism. In Figure 2 the regression line is upward sloping, which suggests that 
firms in high-collectivism countries exhibit lower costs of high leverage. This evidence provides 
further support to the findings in Table 2. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
In the second step, we regress the coefficients from the first step on various country-level 
characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following regression model: 
                                                             
11 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis.  
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𝜇𝜇𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2= 𝜔𝜔0 + 𝜔𝜔1𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐 + 𝜔𝜔2𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+ 𝜔𝜔3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡.     (5) 
In this regression we include country-level variables related to the cultural, economic, legal, and 
political environment. The cultural environment variables include our key test variable 
collectivism (COL) as well as the other cultural dimensions of Hofstede (2001), namely, 
uncertainty avoidance (UAI), masculinity (MAS), and power distance (PDI). Uncertainty 
avoidance captures the extent to which individuals feel anxiety when facing unpredictable 
situations. In high-UAI societies, customers may prefer not to purchase from highly leveraged 
firms out of fear of getting low-quality products, which would increase the costs of high leverage, 
while competitors may be more conservative out of fear of predation not succeeding, which would 
decrease the costs of high leverage. Masculinity captures the extent to which individuals 
emphasize male assertiveness and material success. In high-MAS societies, customers may tend to 
leave financially weak firms and competitors may be more aggressive in preying on financially 
weak firms. Power distance captures the extent to which people challenge hierarchies and 
inequality. It is ex-ante unclear how power distance would affect the costs of high leverage, and 
thus we consider the role of power distance to be an empirical question. 
Turning to the economic environment, we include a developed country indicator 
(DEVELOPED), GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INFLATION), and stock market capitalization 
to GDP (STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT). With respect to the legal and political environments, 
we control for the strength of a country’s legal regime (LEGAL), the perceived ability of a 
country’s citizens to participate in the selection of their government (VOICE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY), political stability and absence of violence (POLITICAL STABILITY), the 
perceived extent to which public power is exercised for private gain (CONTROL OF 
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CORRUPTION), the perceived quality of public service and its independence from political 
pressures (GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS), the extent to which individuals are free to work, 
produce, consume, and invest, with this freedom protected by the state (ECONOMIC FREEDOM), 
the level of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP (SIZE OF GOVERNMENT), and the 
extent of government enterprises and investment (GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT). 
We run eight specifications of Equation (5) that include different combinations of the cultural, 
economic, legal, and political environments variables. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 
5. We are mainly interested in the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs in the presence of 
other country-level factors. In Model 1 we include COL only. In Model 2 we add Hofstede’s other 
three cultural dimensions (UAI, MAS, and PDI). In Model 3 (Model 4), we augment Model 1 by 
adding the economic (legal and political) environment variables. In Model 5 (Model 6), we 
augment Model 2 by controlling for the economic (legal and political) environment variables. 
Model 7 augments Model 1 by including the economic and legal environment variables. The horse-
race regression in Model 8 includes collectivism as well as all other cultural, economic, legal, and 
political environment variables.12  
Across all eight models, we find that COL loads positively and significantly at the 5% level 
or better. Interestingly, among the other cultural variables, we find that the coefficient on UAI is 
consistently negative and significant. This result is in line with the argument above that in high-
UAI societies, customers may avoid purchasing products from highly leveraged firms due to 
                                                             
12 One may be concerned about the possibility of multicollinearity in regressions with a large number of 
independent variables (for example, in Tables 4 and 5). However, the mean values of the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are lower than the threshold value of 10, which suggests that multicollinearity is not a major 
concern. 
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concerns of getting low-quality products. Taken together, the results from this two-step analysis 
reinforce our main evidence that collectivism mitigates high leverage costs.13 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
3.2. Robustness tests  
Firm fixed effect models. Omitted time-invariant firm characteristics may be correlated with 
high leverage and sales growth, which in turn could drive our results. To address this possibility, 
we report results of firm fixed effect models in Internet Appendix Table IA3, Models 1 and 2. In 
these models, all variables are unadjusted (without de-meaning).14 Model 1 includes all firm 
observations. Model 2 includes only those firms that experience a change in high leverage status 
over the sample period. We find that COL×HLEV continues to load significantly at the 1% level, 
which suggests that our main results are not driven by omitted unobserved firm characteristics.  
Self-selection into high leverage. Firms’ choice of high leverage may not be a random 
decision. To address potential self-selection, we use propensity score matching. We first employ a 
Probit model to predict the choice of high leverage based on firm- and country-level characteristics. 
Specifically, we regress HLEV on the full set of control variables, including firm size (SIZE), 
profitability (PROFIT), investment (INVESTMENT), selling expenses (SELLEXP), the developed 
country indicator (DEVELOPED), GDP growth (GDPG), inflation (INFLATION), as well as the 
                                                             
13 In Figure 3, we plot the relation between collectivism and the residuals from the second-step regression 
minus COL. The regression line is moderately upward-sloping, lending further support to the findings in 
Table 2. 
14 The results are qualitatively similar when we de-mean the variables as in the baseline model. 
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strength of a country’s legal regime (LEGAL).15 We then match each highly leveraged firm to the 
less leveraged firm with the closest propensity score. Model 3 of Table IA3 reports the results. Our 
main finding continues to hold, which suggests that self-selection into high leverage does not drive 
our results. 
Sample composition. Similar to other cross-country studies, our sample is unbalanced across 
countries. As shown in Table 1, U.S. and Japanese firms account for the largest percentage of firm-
year observations at 22.9% and 15.2%, respectively. To mitigate concerns that our main finding is 
driven by sample composition biases, in Table IA4, Panel A we re-estimate our baseline regressions 
after sequentially excluding U.S. firms, Japanese firms, and firms from both countries. In addition, 
we run a weighted regression in which each country is assigned a weight equal to the reciprocal of 
its number of observations. The results show significant positive loadings of COL×HLEV on 
SALES_G, mitigating concerns about sample composition biases.16  
Alternative proxies. We next consider whether our main evidence on the link between 
collectivism and high leverage costs is sensitive to alternative proxies for high leverage and 
collectivism. Recall that our main measure of high leverage is two-year lagged HLEV. In Table 
IA4, Panel B we instead lag HLEV by three years. We find that while the impact of collectivism 
on high leverage costs weakens after three years, it is still significant.  
Turning to alternative proxies for COL, we first use the collectivism index of Tang and 
                                                             
15 To address potential omitted country-level characteristics related to the cultural, economic, legal, and 
political environment, we repeat the propensity score matching after also including proxies for omitted 
country-level characteristics in the leverage selection model. The results continue to go through. 
16 In unreported tests, we further find that our main evidence holds over the pre- and post-global financial 
crisis periods.  
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Koveos (2008), who update Hofstede’s index by incorporating the changing economic 
environment within each country (COL_TK). We also use the Institutional Collectivism 
(COL_INST) measure from the GLOBE database constructed by House et al. (2004). The results 
reported in Table IA4, Panel C based on these alternative measures of collectivism continue to be 
consistent with collectivism reducing the costs of high leverage. 
Alternative explanations. One alternative explanation for our main empirical result is firm 
exit bias. Firms that go out of business are not tracked by Compustat. As a result, the firms in 
Compustat are surviving firms, that is, firms that tend to be good performers with low costs of high 
leverage. If either COL or HLEV is correlated with firms’ exit rate, then the observed relation 
between collectivism and high leverage costs could simply reflect firm exit bias. To address this 
concern, in Table IA5, Panel A, we examine the mean rate of firm exits based on Compustat item 
DLRSN (reason for deletion). We find that highly leveraged firms are more likely to exit the 
sample. This implies that, if anything, our high-leverage sample should be biased toward better-
performing (i.e., surviving) firms, which would work against documenting a negative relation 
between high leverage and sales growth. Thus, our evidence on high leverage costs is not likely to 
be explained by firm exit bias. When we empirically investigate whether the relation between 
collectivism and high leverage costs is driven by firm exit bias, we indeed find in Table IA5, Panel 
B, that firms in high collectivism countries have a significantly lower probability of exiting the 
sample. The high collectivism sample is therefore biased toward low-performing firms, which 
works against a negative relation between collectivism and high leverage costs. This suggests that 
the relation we document between collectivism and high leverage costs is not affected by firm exit 
bias. 
Another alternative explanation for our main result is product market structure. Culture may 
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be correlated with product market structure if, for instance, industries in high (low) collectivism 
countries are less (more) competitive. In less competitive environments, customers may have 
fewer choices and hence may stick with their original product choice regardless of the financial 
condition of the firm. In this case our evidence of lower costs of high leverage in high collectivism 
countries may simply reflect less competition.  
To test whether our results are driven by this explanation, in Table IA6 we further control for 
product market structure variables as well as their interactions with high leverage. We employ two 
types of market structure variables. In Model 1, we use the natural logarithm of the four-firm 
concentration ratio (FFC), which captures the total market share of the four largest firms in an 
industry. In Model 2, we use the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI), 
which captures the degree of market concentration in an industry. We find that the interaction terms 
FFC×HLEV and HHI×HLEV load insignificantly, which suggests that the product market 
structure explanation is not likely to hold. More importantly, our main interaction COL×HLEV is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, consistent with our main evidence. 
Overall, the results above reinforce our main finding that collectivism mitigates the costs of 
high leverage. 
3.3. The effect of culture on the actions of employees and suppliers 
So far, our results suggest that collectivism reduces the costs of high leverage driven by 
customers and competitors. Our focus on these two stakeholder groups builds on extant literature 
on high leverage costs, which generally overlooks the role of other stakeholder groups (e.g., 
Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Titman, 1984; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 1995; 
Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006). However, while Titman (1984) and Maksimovic 
and Titman (1991) focus on the behavior of customers, they argue that their analyses can be applied 
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to other stakeholder groups such as employees and suppliers.17 Accordingly, in this section we 
extend our analysis on the relation between collectivism and the costs of high leverage to include 
these stakeholder groups. In particular, in the spirit of Titman (1984) and Maksimovic and Titman 
(1991), we extend the “customer” story to high leverage costs driven by employees and suppliers.  
Like customers, employees and suppliers are less likely to do business with highly leveraged 
firms because they have strong incentives to retain cash flows by cutting those costs not guaranteed 
in explicit contracts. In the case of employees, high leverage can be costly because highly 
leveraged firms may cut job training, the quality of the work environment, or salaries and benefits 
in an effort to increase cash flows.18 High leverage is therefore expected to induce employees to 
leave the firm. We conjecture that this effect is stronger for more talented employees in labor-
intensive industries because their contracts contain more implicit components such as training and 
quality of facilities. In the case of suppliers, high leverage can be costly because a highly leveraged 
firm may have unstable or lower demand for a supplier’s products, or may have difficulty making 
timely payments on trade credit.19 High leverage should therefore induce suppliers to extend less 
                                                             
17 Titman (1984) argues that liquidation can impose costs on employees and suppliers in addition to 
customers. Similarly, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggest that while high leverage negatively impacts 
a firm’s ability to ensure product quality, their analysis is applicable to many other types of implicit 
contracts such as those with suppliers or employees. 
18 For example, according to the Washington Post (October 28, 2004, E07), “Delta is seeking $1 billion in 
pay and benefit cuts from its pilots” because “without the cuts, it would have to file for bankruptcy court 
protection.”  
19 For example, according to The Economist (January 22, 2002), “Kmart’s suppliers became nervous as 
they saw the cash run out. Fleming, which supplies food and groceries to the discount chain’s 2,100 stores, 
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trade credit to the firm. 
Also, as in the case of customers, we posit that collectivism mitigates unfavorable actions on 
the part of employees and suppliers with respect to highly leveraged firms, which results in lower 
costs of high leverage. For example, tight group structures are likely to reduce agency conflicts 
between a highly leveraged firm and its employees and suppliers, and cultural norms that 
emphasize other stakeholders’ interests are likely to reduce the tendency to behave 
opportunistically towards employees and suppliers. Accordingly, we hypothesize that, in addition 
to its effects on the actions of customers and competitors, collectivism mitigates high leverage 
costs through its effects on the actions of employees and suppliers. 
To test these predictions, we re-run our main analysis after replacing the dependent variable 
(SALES_G) with employee growth (EMPLOYEE_G) and accounts payable growth (AP_G) as 
follows: 
𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  or 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡= 𝜂𝜂0 + 𝜂𝜂1𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝜂𝜂2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + �𝜂𝜂3𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1+ �𝜂𝜂4𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝜂𝜂5𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝜂𝜂6𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐+ 𝜂𝜂7𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂8𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜂𝜂9𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,    (6) 
                                                             
stopped making shipments. Other vendors kept their delivery trucks away.” 
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𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡  or 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃_𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡= 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾3𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝛾4𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡+ �𝛾𝛾5𝑘𝑘𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛾𝛾6𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1
+ �𝛾𝛾7𝑘𝑘𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘2
𝑘𝑘=1+ 𝛾𝛾8𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝛾9𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 + 𝛾𝛾10𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2+ 𝛾𝛾11𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾12𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝛾13𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾14𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐× 𝐻𝐻𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐻𝐻𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡−2 + 𝛾𝛾15𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 .    (7) 
Under the employee dimension, we examine EMPLOYEE_G, which captures employees’ 
willingness to work for a firm. We classify an industry as a high (low) labor intensity industry in 
a given year if it has wage-to-capital ratio greater than (less than or equal to) the median of all 
industries two years before the base year. In Models 1 through 4 of Table 6, Panel A, we find that 
high leverage is negatively associated with relative-to-industry employee growth. Additionally, an 
increase in collectivism from the 25th to the 75th percentile allows highly leveraged firms to reduce 
relative-to-industry employee growth losses by 1.53% (2.52% for high labor intensity industries, 
0.81% for low labor intensity industries). These results suggest that employees tend to leave a 
highly leveraged firm, but are less likely to do so if the firm is in a collectivist country. 
Under the supplier dimension, we examine AP_G, which captures suppliers’ incentives to 
extend trade credit. In Model 5 of Table 6, Panel A, we find that high leverage significantly lowers 
accounts payable growth. This result suggests that suppliers are less willing to extend trade credit 
to highly leveraged firms. Model 6 further shows that increasing collectivism from the 25th to the 
75th percentile is associated with 2.39% higher relative-to-industry accounts payable growth for 
highly leveraged firms, which indicates that collectivism significantly attenuates suppliers’ 
reluctance to extend trade credit. 
To shed more light on whether the actions of employees and suppliers ultimately contribute 
to highly leveraged firms’ market share losses, we examine whether collectivism plays a more 
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important role in curbing such losses when employees and suppliers act more strongly. To capture 
the actions of employees (suppliers) with respect to a highly leveraged firm, we consider the 
presence of an employee (supplier) relations policy. If a highly leveraged firm has a policy in place 
that aims to improve relations with the firm’s employees (suppliers), we would expect the adverse 
actions of employees (suppliers) toward the firm to be less pronounced. In this case, collectivism 
would play a less important role in curbing employee- and supplier-driven costs. We rely on 
Thomson Reuters’ ASSET4 ESG data to determine whether a firm has an established policy related 
to employee relations (Does the company describe, claim to have, or mention the processes in 
place to improve its labor-union relations?) and supplier relations (Does the company describe, 
claim to have, or mention processes in place to improve its partnership with suppliers and 
contractors?). As reported in Table 6, Panel B, we find that for firms that do not have policies 
related to improving employee or supplier relations, collectivism has a strong and significant 
influence on the costs of high leverage, while such influence is insignificant for firms that do have 
such policies. These results suggest that in addition to customers and competitors, employees and 
suppliers also help explain the relation between collectivism and high leverage costs.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
The results above, together with those reported in Section 3.1, suggest that collectivism 
reduces high leverage costs driven by customers and competitors, as well as employees and 
suppliers. These findings thus suggest that national culture affects firm outcomes by 
simultaneously influencing various stakeholders in the firm and its environment. 
3.4. Collectivism, legal institutions, and the costs of high leverage 
We posit that in weak legal environments, where contracts cannot efficiently regulate the 
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behaviors of market participants, collectivism exerts greater influence on the costs of high leverage. 
High leverage costs capture contracting costs: customer-driven costs arise because highly 
leveraged firms may renege on implicit contracts with customers, and competitor-driven costs arise 
because imperfect financing contracts limit the ability of highly leveraged firms to raise external 
funds, which induces competitors to take predatory actions. Under incomplete contracts (Hart and 
Moore, 1988; Williamson, 1998), the degree to which these contracting costs can be reduced 
depends on a country’s contracting environment, which includes both formal institutions, such as 
rule of law and property rights protection, and informal institutions, such as national culture. A 
country’s legal system and culture can act as substitutes in regulating the behaviors of economic 
agents and hence in reducing the costs of high leverage. For example, in countries with a highly 
developed legal framework, firms’ implicit contracts with customers (e.g., promises on product 
quality) may turn into explicit contracts (warranties on products sold), in which case high leverage 
costs would be regulated largely by the legal system. In contrast, in a country with a weak legal 
system, culture becomes more important in mitigating high leverage costs. We test this idea in 
Table 7 using two proxies for the strength of a country’s legal system: the law and order index 
from ICRG and the legal system and property rights index from EFW.  
A country is defined as having a strong (weak) legal system if its law and order index is 
greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. 
Similarly, a country is defined as having a strong (weak) legal system and property rights if the 
legal system and property rights index is greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the 
overall sample two years before the base year. Consistent with our expectation, Models 2 to 5 of 
Table 7 show that the effects of collectivism on high leverage costs are significant and more 
pronounced for firms in countries with a weak legal system, but are insignificant for firms in 
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countries with a more developed legal system.20 These findings should be interpreted with caution, 
however, because as shown at the bottom of Table 7, the difference in the coefficients on 
COL×HLEV between the low and high subsamples is not statistically significant. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
In sum, the results above suggest that collectivism has a significant effect on high leverage 
costs in an imperfect contracting environment, consistent with our prediction. 
4. Conclusion 
Prior research suggests that high leverage is costly because highly leveraged firms have 
incentives to take opportunistic actions that result in a loss of customers, and highly leveraged 
firms’ competitors have incentives to take predatory actions that result in a reduction in sales 
growth. In this study, we investigate whether national culture as captured by a country’s 
collectivism score mitigates these market share losses of high leverage. 
We argue that due to incomplete contracting, a country’s culture is an important determinant 
of the costs of high leverage. Based on a large sample of 241,906 firm-year observations from 46 
countries over the 1989–2016 period, we find that collectivism reduces highly leveraged firms’ 
relative-to-industry market share (i.e., sales growth) losses. In particular, the results suggest that, 
in line with our predictions, customer- and competitor-driven costs of high leverage are lower in 
                                                             
20 One could argue that these results are an artifact of the effect of national culture on the effectiveness of a 
country’s legal system (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz, 2005). In 
unreported tests, we repeat our split-sample analysis using the residuals from regressing proxies for the 
strength of legal protection on collectivism and a set of controls. Our results remain unaffected. 
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collectivist countries. Subsample tests further show that the effect of collectivism on the costs of 
high leverage is more pronounced for firms whose customers and competitors are more sensitive 
to firms’ use of high leverage, consistent with Campello (2006) and Opler and Titman (1994). Our 
main findings are robust to accounting for the unbalanced sample composition as well as to 
considering other measures of culture and alternative explanations. In additional analysis we build 
on extant theoretical models of high leverage to examine whether high leverage costs are also 
driven by employees and suppliers, and if so, whether collectivism reduces the costs of high 
leverage driven by these stakeholder groups. Using the extended model, we find that collectivism 
helps highly leveraged firms retain customers, guard against rival predation, retain employees, and 
obtain trade credit from suppliers. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that culture plays a 
more important role than legal institutions in shaping the product market performance of highly 
leveraged firms. In sum, our analysis on the interactions between capital structure and product 
market performance improves our understanding of the effect of national culture on the behavior 
of key firm stakeholder groups and in turn on firm outcomes. 
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  Figure 1. Collectivism and high leverage costs across countries 
This figure plots the relation between a country’s collectivism score and the costs of high leverage (λ1) obtained from estimating Equation (1) for each country. 
A positive λ1 indicates higher sales growth for the highly leveraged firm thus lower costs of high leverage. The fitted line shows an upward-sloping trend. 
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Figure 2. Collectivism and the interactions between high leverage and the country dummies 
This figure plots the relation between a country’s collectivism score and averages of the coefficients on the interactions between high leverage and the 46 
country dummies, where the coefficients come from a regression of SALES_G on the interaction terms and a set of controls (Equation (4)). A positive 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates lower cost of high leverage. The fitted line shows an upward-sloping trend.  
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Figure 3. Collectivism and second-step regression residuals (excluding collectivism)  
This figure plots a country’s collectivism score against its second-step regression residuals, where collectivism is omitted from the independent variables in the 
second-step regression. The fitted line shows an upward-sloping trend.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics by country                                   
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Argentina 430 0.07 -0.01 0.10 0.54 0.49 0.86 0.56 0.28 4.83 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.16 0.16 0.00 1.59 19.46 5.17 
Australia 7,757 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.36 0.51 0.61 0.33 3.81 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 0.07 1.19 1.02 1.00 1.40 2.77 22.41 
Austria 695 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.45 0.11 0.70 0.79 0.35 5.97 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.16 1.00 1.03 1.76 15.00 
Belgium 954 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.25 0.65 0.94 0.54 0.33 6.04 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.80 1.72 15.00 
Brazil 2,466 0.09 0.06 0.13 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.49 0.34 6.32 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.00 1.54 8.13 10.13 
Canada 7,850 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.39 0.48 0.52 0.28 5.13 0.01 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.42 0.40 1.00 1.01 2.15 23.12 
Chile 1,281 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.77 0.63 0.86 0.28 0.34 5.84 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.00 3.09 4.93 19.23 
China 21,376 0.16 0.05 0.19 0.80 0.80 0.30 0.66 0.30 5.84 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.00 8.78 3.60 4.03 
Colombia 115 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.87 0.67 0.80 0.64 0.35 6.62 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.14 0.00 3.01 5.87 5.41 
Denmark 1,322 0.05 0.02 0.09 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.30 5.20 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.28 0.26 1.00 0.65 1.92 24.00 
Finland 1,542 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.37 0.33 0.59 0.26 0.25 5.70 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.12 1.00 1.04 1.71 21.00 
France 6,680 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.29 0.68 0.86 0.43 0.30 5.79 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.17 1.00 0.67 1.48 17.32 
Germany 6,739 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.33 0.35 0.65 0.66 0.34 5.48 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.18 1.00 1.27 1.20 17.60 
Greece 1,656 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.65 0.60 1.12 0.57 0.34 5.23 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.22 0.20 1.00 -1.61 1.22 8.81 
Hong Kong 1,066 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.75 0.68 0.29 0.57 0.29 6.13 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.23 0.00 3.19 0.98 24.58 
Hungary 40 0.10 0.00 0.23 0.20 0.46 0.82 0.88 0.48 5.91 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.21 1.00 2.92 5.45 8.07 
India 3,271 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.86 0.78 0.48 0.46 0.28 4.91 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.00 3.97 9.55 10.98 
Indonesia 17,481 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.52 0.77 0.40 0.56 0.27 4.35 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.00 5.88 5.86 20.14 
Ireland 408 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.68 0.34 6.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.26 0.26 0.00 2.61 2.00 30.00 
Israel 1,551 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.46 0.13 0.81 0.47 0.29 5.11 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.29 0.29 0.00 1.80 1.94 20.00 
Italy 2,452 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.24 0.50 0.75 0.70 0.33 6.23 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.14 0.13 1.00 -0.33 1.83 8.19 
Jamaica 49 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.61 0.45 0.13 0.68 0.35 4.67 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.15 9.72 8.53 
Japan 36,780 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.54 0.54 0.92 0.95 0.24 6.09 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.21 1.00 0.75 -0.68 22.50 
Korea, Rep. 7,555 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.82 0.60 0.85 0.39 0.26 6.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.00 3.15 1.93 22.10 
Luxembourg 164 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.40 0.40 0.70 0.50 0.30 7.80 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.24 0.21 1.00 0.80 2.56 12.00 
Malaysia 8,500 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.74 1.04 0.36 0.50 0.30 4.35 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.15 0.00 3.12 3.49 19.46 
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Mexico 1,131 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.69 0.33 7.16 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.94 5.08 6.63 
Morocco 170 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.54 0.70 0.68 0.53 0.34 5.27 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.00 2.98 1.22 9.72 
Netherlands 1,484 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.38 0.53 0.14 0.33 6.43 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.16 0.16 1.00 0.94 1.85 15.00 
New Zealand 738 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.21 0.22 0.49 0.58 0.25 4.53 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.18 1.00 1.06 2.46 22.27 
Norway 1,516 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.31 0.31 0.50 0.08 0.25 5.59 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.13 1.00 0.62 3.92 21.00 
Pakistan 1,786 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.86 0.55 0.70 0.50 0.28 4.24 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.00 1.92 10.36 12.65 
Peru 631 0.11 0.01 0.17 0.84 0.64 0.87 0.42 0.31 5.43 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.00 3.88 2.98 10.79 
Philippines 979 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.68 0.94 0.44 0.64 0.27 4.69 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.20 0.19 0.00 3.55 3.64 9.69 
Poland 2,649 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.40 0.68 0.93 0.64 0.34 4.36 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.18 1.00 3.77 2.24 8.87 
Portugal 419 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.73 0.63 1.04 0.31 0.38 6.49 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.14 1.00 0.25 2.06 12.50 
Russian Fed. 805 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.61 0.93 0.95 0.36 0.37 7.70 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.00 2.58 12.44 14.63 
Singapore 5,398 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.80 0.74 0.08 0.48 0.27 4.62 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.00 3.33 1.21 25.17 
South Africa 2,243 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.63 0.33 5.31 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.15 0.00 1.43 6.83 11.56 
Spain 1,107 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.49 0.57 0.86 0.42 0.38 6.86 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.16 1.00 0.51 1.55 24.32 
Sweden 3,486 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.05 0.29 4.75 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.34 1.00 1.47 1.69 21.00 
Switzerland 2,389 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.32 0.34 0.58 0.70 0.27 6.28 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.20 1.00 0.92 0.58 15.32 
Thailand 5,199 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.80 0.64 0.64 0.34 0.28 4.53 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.00 3.27 2.62 11.27 
Turkey 1,180 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.63 0.66 0.85 0.45 0.33 5.93 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.00 3.53 10.01 11.49 
United Kingdom 13,001 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.35 0.35 0.66 0.33 5.13 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.32 0.32 1.00 1.23 2.33 27.68 
United States 55,415 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.40 0.46 0.62 0.29 5.50 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.41 0.40 1.00 1.10 2.14 15.82 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for the full sample 
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Mean   0.11 0.03 0.11 0.39 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.28 5.24 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.25 0.69 2.43 2.59 17.88 
Min   -1.00 -0.64 -1.00 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.00 -6.91 -1.75 -1.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.73 -6.01 3.00 
Q1   -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 0.09 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.00 3.92 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.83 0.89 15.00 
Median   0.09 0.01 0.07 0.33 0.50 0.46 0.62 0.00 5.19 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.15 1.00 1.91 2.29 18.00 
Q3   0.24 0.09 0.30 0.54 0.68 0.81 0.66 1.00 6.50 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.28 1.00 3.76 3.70 22.50 
Max   2.00 1.27 2.00 0.87 1.04 1.12 0.95 1.00 13.08 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.39 6.00 6.00 1.00 13.57 52.85 30.00 
SD   0.31 0.23 0.44 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.45 2.03 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.49 0.46 0.46 3.53 3.28 6.10 
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Panel C. Correlation matrix  
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SALES_Gt   1                                     
EMPLOYEE_Gt 0.42*** 1                                   
AP_Gt   0.37*** 0.30*** 1                                 
COLc   -0.01*** -0.01** -0.02*** 1                               
PDIc   0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.74*** 1                             
UAIc   -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.05*** 0.54*** 0.28*** 1                           
MASc   -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.05*** 0.30*** 0.13*** 0.65*** 1                         
HLEVt   0.01** 0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 1                       
SIZEt   0.05*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.05*** -0.01*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.25*** 1                     
PROFITt-1   0.09*** 0.15*** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.32*** 1                   
PROFITt-2   0.04*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.31*** 0.64*** 1                 
INVESTMENTt-1 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.03*** -0.07*** -0.02*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 0.13*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.15*** 1               
INVESTMENTt-2 0.09*** 0.05*** 0.04*** -0.08*** -0.02*** -0.14*** -0.15*** 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.71*** 1             
SELLEXPt-1   0.00 -0.04*** -0.01*** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.02*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.50*** -0.45*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 1           
SELLEXPt-2   0.01*** -0.03*** -0.01** -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.02*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.47*** -0.50*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 0.89*** 1         
DEVELOPEDc   -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.57*** -0.66*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 00.00 0.07*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 1       
GDPGc,t   0.16*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.33*** -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.01*** -0.06*** 0.06*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.48*** 1     
INFLATIONc,t   0.07*** 0.03*** 0.06*** -0.02*** 0.19*** -0.44*** -0.49*** 0.02*** -0.11*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.00 -0.54*** 0.32*** 1   
LEGALc   -0.03*** -0.01** -0.04*** 0.10*** -0.13*** 0.16*** 0.33*** -0.01*** -0.03*** 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.25*** -0.11*** -0.33*** 1 
This table reports the summary statistics. Panel A presents the averages of the key variables in the main regression by country. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel C shows the correlation matrix for the 
key variables in the main regression. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Detailed descriptions of variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix A. The full 
sample comprises 241,906 firm-year observations from 46 countries. 
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Table 2. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: Main evidence 
 Baseline Model Top 3 Deciles Top 1 Decile 
 (1) (2) (3) 
COLc×HLEVt-2  0.028*** 0.041***  
(3.74) (2.69) 
COLc  -0.002 -0.007  
(-0.46) (-0.73) 
HLEVt-2 -0.011*** -0.040*** -0.081***  
(-7.72) (-4.85) (-5.12) 
SIZEt 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.017***  
(20.87) (20.97) (16.95) 
PROFITt-1 0.134*** 0.135*** 0.104***  
(15.48) (15.49) (7.78) 
PROFITt-2 -0.013 -0.013 -0.016  
(-1.59) (-1.55) (-1.30) 
INVESTMENTt-1 0.276*** 0.276*** 0.289***  
(15.34) (15.32) (8.84) 
INVESTMENTt-2 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.129***  
(9.55) (9.40) (4.39) 
SELLEXPt-1 0.003 0.003 0.006  
(0.78) (0.76) (1.26) 
SELLEXPt-2 0.022*** 0.021*** 0.015***  
(5.42) (5.38) (2.79) 
DEVELOPEDc×HLEVt-2  0.017*** 0.021**  
 (3.40) (2.05) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.001  
(-5.01) (-3.96) (-0.10) 
GDPGc,t×HLEVt-2  0.001 0.002  
 (1.09) (1.41) 
GDPGc,t -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004***  
(-5.79) (-5.30) (-5.25) 
INFLATIONc,t×HLEVt-2  0.002*** 0.005***  
 (4.00) (4.64) 
INFLATIONc,t 0.001** 0.000 -0.001  
(2.19) (0.15) (-0.94) 
LEGALc×HLEVt-2  -0.000 0.000  
 (-0.29) (0.45) 
LEGALc 0.000 0.000 -0.001**  
(0.68) (0.78) (-2.57) 
CONSTANT 0.004 0.007 0.042***  
(1.19) (1.42) (4.32) 
N 241,906 241,906 73,205 
R2 0.015 0.016 0.017 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales 
growth, which is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the collectivism score 
(COL), our measure of high leverage (HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed variable definitions and 
data sources are provided in Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 
2006), we use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is 
measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-
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industry-year means. Model 1 presents results for Equation (1) on the costs of high leverage. Model 2 presents results 
for Equation (2) on the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage. Model 3 repeats Model 2 using a more 
extreme definition of high leverage that assigns a value of one to the top-decile firm-year observations and a value of 
zero to the bottom-decile observations. Comparisons based on this definition are between extremely high-leveraged 
firms and extremely low-leveraged firms. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: Actions of customers and competitors based on 
Campello’s (2006) model 
 
Baseline Model Customer  
Product Specialization 
Competitor  
Industry Debt Level 
 
 
High Low Low High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.028*** 0.039*** 0.019* 0.052*** 0.022** 
  (3.74) (3.58) (1.78) (2.77) (2.27) 
COLc -0.002 -0.000 0.006 -0.015 0.009 
  (-0.46) (-0.05) (1.06) (-1.38) (1.43) 
HLEVt-2 -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.044*** -0.051*** -0.040*** 
  (-4.85) (-3.52) (-3.49) (-2.81) (-3.65) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CONSTANT 0.007 -0.005 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.006 
  (1.42) (-0.81) (3.00) (3.54) (0.85) 
N 241,906 115,287 126,619 91,996 149,910 
R2 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.014 0.019 
p-value of difference test 0.095 0.078 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equation (2) using different subsamples related to the costs of high 
leverage. The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and 
competitors. The independent variables include the collectivism score (COL), our measure of high leverage 
(HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the 
relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured 
relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-
year means. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, a firm is 
classified as having high (low) product specialization if its R&D-to-sales ratio is above (below) the sample median 
two years before the base year. In Models 4 and 5, industries with a high (low) debt level comprise those with an 
average long-term debt ratio above (below or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base 
year. The last row reports the p-value for the test of difference in the coefficients on COL×HLEV between the low 
and high subsamples. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: Actions of customers and competitors based on Opler 
and Titman’s (1994) model   
Customer  
Product Specialization 
Competitor  
Industry Debt Level   
High Low Low High 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COLc×INDUSTRY DISTRESSt×HLEVt-2 0.650** 0.793** 0.309 1.104* 0.531 
(1.97) (1.97) (0.51) (1.88) (1.24) 
INDUSTRY DISTRESSt×HLEVt-2 -0.089** -0.115* -0.018 -0.139** -0.073 
(-1.98) (-1.93) (-0.25) (-2.07) (-1.09) 
COLc×INDUSTRY DISTRESSt -0.327* -0.346 -0.238 -0.320 -0.466 
(-1.93) (-1.49) (-0.78) (-1.54) (-1.58) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.109 -0.005 0.377 -0.032 0.197  
(0.78) (-0.03) (1.36) (-0.12) (1.19) 
COLc 0.067 0.102 0.067 0.005 0.142  
(0.79) (0.92) (0.49) (0.04) (1.27) 
INDUSTRY DISTRESSt 0.039* 0.037 0.033 0.040 0.052  
(1.71) (1.00) (0.97) (1.47) (1.17) 
HLEVt-2 0.030 0.025 0.034 0.037 0.007  
(1.39) (0.92) (0.89) (0.95) (0.24) 
LOG (SALE)t-2 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002* 0.006*** -0.001  
(3.52) (3.37) (1.91) (5.57) (-1.52) 
PROFITABILITYt-2 0.166*** 0.186*** 0.155*** 0.166*** 0.158***  
(21.62) (14.93) (15.66) (17.60) (11.60) 
INVESTMENTt-2 0.677*** 0.688*** 0.615*** 0.653*** 0.694***  
(24.11) (20.86) (11.27) (14.01) (20.34) 
ASSET SALEt-2 -0.800*** -0.721*** -1.088*** -1.041*** -0.679***  
(-18.25) (-14.37) (-12.14) (-14.08) (-13.20)       
GDPGc,t×HLEVt-2 0.003* -0.000 0.008*** 0.005* 0.003  
(1.79) (-0.09) (3.20) (1.83) (1.59) 
GDPGc,t -0.003*** -0.002 -0.004*** -0.002* -0.004***  
(-3.20) (-1.60) (-2.98) (-1.67) (-3.50) 
INFLATIONc,t×HLEVt-2 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.010* 0.002  
(-1.02) (-0.30) (-1.02) (-1.94) (0.69) 
INFLATIONc,t 0.003** 0.002 0.006** 0.005** -0.000  
(2.10) (0.91) (2.20) (2.36) (-0.07) 
LEGALc×HLEVt-2 -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.002  
(-1.42) (-0.63) (-1.50) (-0.48) (-1.05) 
LEGALc -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.004**  
(-0.98) (-1.10) (-0.13) (0.47) (-2.36) 
CONSTANT -0.004 -0.003 -0.017 -0.052*** 0.067***  
(-0.30) (-0.14) (-0.83) (-2.64) (3.36) 
N 74,303 40,951 33,352 37,201 37,102 
R2 0.046 0.054 0.039 0.046 0.049 
p-value of difference test 0.095 0.078 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equation (3) using different subsamples related to the costs of high leverage. The 
dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables 
include the collectivism score (COL), our measure of high leverage (HLEV), an industry distress indicator (INDUSTRY 
DISTRESS), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix A. 
Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method 
when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-
level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model 
using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, a firm is classified as having high (low) product specialization if its R&D-to-sales ratio 
is above (below) the sample median two years before the base year. In Models 4 and 5, industries with a high (low) debt level 
comprise those with an average long-term debt ratio above (below or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before 
the base year. The last row reports the p-value for the test of difference in the coefficients on COL×HLEV between the low and 
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high subsamples. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Country-level characteristics and the costs of high leverage: Two-step analysis 
Panel A. First-step results 
Country Coefficients on Country Dummy×HLEVt-2 
Luxembourg 0.077 
Turkey 0.048 
Hong Kong 0.041 
Philippines 0.038 
Israel 0.034 
Brazil 0.028 
Hungary 0.027 
Chile 0.025 
Thailand 0.023 
India 0.022 
Greece 0.022 
China 0.015 
Singapore 0.012 
Denmark 0.012 
Australia 0.009 
Ireland 0.007 
Switzerland 0.006 
France 0.005 
Jamaica 0.005 
Canada 0.003 
United States 0.002 
Portugal 0.002 
Norway 0.001 
Pakistan 0.001 
Russian Fed. 0.001 
South Africa 0.000 
Belgium 0.000 
Italy -0.001 
Korea, Rep. -0.003 
Malaysia -0.004 
Peru -0.006 
Spain -0.007 
Poland -0.008 
Japan -0.010 
Finland -0.011 
Sweden -0.011 
Indonesia -0.013 
New Zealand -0.014 
Austria -0.014 
United Kingdom -0.015 
Argentina -0.018 
Germany -0.019 
Netherlands -0.020 
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Mexico -0.027 
Morocco -0.039 
Colombia -0.046 
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Panel B. Second-step results  
Coefficients on Country Dummy×HLEVt-2 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cultural Environment 
        
COLc 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.010** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.016*** 0.034*** 
  (3.92) (6.62) (2.27) (3.29) (4.05) (6.02) (2.94) (5.41) 
PDIc 
 
-0.005 
  
0.001 0.009 
 
0.011* 
  
 
(-1.16) 
  
(0.21) (1.42) 
 
(1.81) 
UAIc 
 
-0.018*** 
  
-0.014*** -0.016*** 
 
-0.014*** 
  
 
(-4.61) 
  
(-2.85) (-3.21) 
 
(-2.71) 
MASc 
 
0.008* 
  
0.007 0.007 
 
0.009 
  
 
(1.86) 
  
(1.40) (1.40) 
 
(1.60) 
Economic Environment 
        
DEVELOPEDc 
  
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.000 
  
  
(0.68) 
 
(0.55) 
 
(-0.48) (-0.03) 
GDPGc,t 
  
0.000 
 
-0.000 
 
0.000 -0.000 
  
  
(1.08) 
 
(-0.02) 
 
(0.97) (-0.67) 
INFLATIONc,t 
  
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.000 0.000 
  
  
(0.36) 
 
(0.52) 
 
(-0.14) (0.26) 
STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTc,t 
  
0.035*** 
 
0.029*** 
 
0.035*** 0.033*** 
  
  
(5.96) 
 
(4.99) 
 
(4.30) (4.77) 
Legal and Political Environment 
        
LEGALc 
   
0.000 
 
0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
  
   
(0.48) 
 
(5.57) (0.12) (5.61) 
VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITYc,t 
   
-0.006*** 
 
-0.002 -0.002 0.001     
(-2.68) 
 
(-0.78) (-0.97) (0.60) 
POLITICAL STABILITYc,t 
   
0.006*** 
 
0.003* 0.005*** 0.002 
  
   
(3.30) 
 
(1.69) (2.94) (1.11) 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTIONc,t 
   
0.007** 
 
0.014*** 0.006* 0.014*** 
  
   
(2.12) 
 
(4.62) (1.91) (4.44) 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESSc,t 
   
-0.005 
 
-0.014*** -0.006* -0.015***     
(-1.50) 
 
(-4.29) (-1.71) (-4.63) 
ECONOMIC FREEDOMc,t 
   
-0.031 
 
-0.071*** -0.045** -0.084*** 
  
   
(-1.64) 
 
(-4.20) (-2.25) (-4.65) 
SIZE OF GOVERNMENTc,t 
   
-0.007 
 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.004 
  
   
(-1.26) 
 
(-1.23) (-0.56) (-0.80) 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENTc,t 
   
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***     
(4.43) 
 
(6.43) (3.56) (5.55) 
CONSTANT -0.004* -0.005 -0.007* 0.004 -0.011** 0.004 0.013 0.008 
  (-1.81) (-1.30) (-1.95) (0.36) (-2.08) (0.29) (0.93) (0.55) 
N 789 789 714 650 714 650 635 635 
R2 0.023 0.101 0.069 0.075 0.136 0.238 0.106 0.273 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equations (4) and (5). In the first step, each year we regress SALES_G on the interactions between 
HLEV and 46 country dummies and a set of controls. Panel A reports averages of the coefficients across the 46 countries. In the second step, we 
regress these coefficients on country-level characteristics related to the cultural, economic, and legal and political environments. The results are 
reported in Panel B. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix A. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: The role of employees and suppliers 
Panel A. Employee and accounts payable growth  
 Employee (EMPL_Gt) Supplier (AP_Gt) 
  
Full sample High labor  
intensity 
Low labor  
intensity 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 
 
0.034*** 0.056*** 0.018 
 
0.053*** 
  
 
(4.61) (3.05) (1.08) 
 
(5.30) 
COLc 
 
0.001 -0.014 0.006 
 
-0.005 
  
 
(0.30) (-1.34) (0.53) 
 
(-0.90) 
HLEVt-2 -0.015*** -0.040*** -0.057*** -0.032* -0.011*** -0.053*** 
  (-11.52) (-4.39) (-2.84) (-1.91) (-6.05) (-4.73) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CONSTANT 0.004* -0.002 0.011 -0.005 0.004 0.003 
  (1.84) (-0.34) (1.03) (-0.46) (1.53) (0.56) 
N 146,675 146,675 72,861 36,927 234,229 234,229 
R2 0.026 0.026 0.028 0.023 0.008 0.008 
p-value of difference test  0.063     
Panel B. Employee and supplier relation policies  
 Baseline Employee Relation Policy Supplier Relation Policy 
    Yes No Yes No 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.028*** -0.025 0.030* -0.028 0.033** 
  (3.74) (-0.74) (1.93) (-0.73) (2.29) 
COLc -0.002 0.082*** 0.031 0.112*** 0.019 
  (-0.46) (3.29) (1.62) (4.11) (1.00) 
HLEVt-2 -0.040*** -0.026 -0.011 -0.039 -0.006 
  (-4.85) (-0.74) (-0.64) (-0.82) (-0.34) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CONSTANT 0.007 -0.032 -0.003 -0.040 -0.001 
  (1.42) (-1.45) (-0.18) (-1.37) (-0.05) 
N 241,906 4,171 16,672 3,560 17,283 
R2 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.013 
p-value of difference test  
 
0.070 0.068 
Panel A reports OLS regression results for Equations (6) and (7). The dependent variables are EMPLOYEE_G 
(employee growth) or AP_G (accounts payable growth). The independent variables include a country’s collectivism 
score (COL), our measure of high leverage (HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. In Models 3 and 4, we 
classify an industry as a high (low) labor intensity industry in a given year if it has a wage-to-capital ratio greater than 
(smaller than or equal to) the median of all industries two years before the base year. Panel B reports OLS regression 
results for Equation (2) using different subsamples related to the presence of employee and supplier relations policies. 
The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and competitors. The 
independent variables include a country’s collectivism score (COL), our measure of high leverage (HLEV), and firm- 
and country-level controls. In Models 2 and 3, a firm is defined as having an employee relations policy if it describes, 
claims to have, or mentions the processes in place to improve its labor-union relations. In Models 4 and 5, a firm is 
defined as having a supplier relations policy if it describes, claims to have, or mentions the processes in place to 
improve its partnerships with suppliers and contractors. The last row in each panel reports the p-value for the test of 
difference in the coefficients on COL×HLEV between the subsamples. Detailed variable definitions and data sources 
are provided in Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we 
use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured 
relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year 
means. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: Legal environment   
Baseline Law and Order Legal system and Property rights   
High Low High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.028*** 0.002 0.024*** 0.019 0.038*** 
  (3.74) (0.08) (2.93) (1.50) (3.45) 
COLc -0.002 -0.006 -0.009* 0.038*** -0.028*** 
  (-0.46) (-0.32) (-1.92) (4.84) (-4.19) 
HLEVt-2 -0.040*** -0.017 -0.040*** 0.006 -0.056*** 
  (-4.85) (-0.46) (-4.63) (0.34) (-4.95) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CONSTANT 0.007 -0.001 0.015*** -0.019* 0.017** 
  (1.42) (-0.04) (2.97) (-1.80) (2.50) 
N 241,906 55,581 186,325 124,358 117,548 
R2 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.022 
p-value of difference test 0.202 0.129 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equation (2) using different subsamples related to the legal 
environment. The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and 
competitors. The independent variables include a country’s collectivism score (COL), our measure of high leverage 
(HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the 
relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured 
relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-
year means. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, a country 
is defined as having a strong (weak) legal system if its law and order index is greater than (less than or equal to) 
the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. In Models 4 and 5, a country is defined as having 
a good (bad) legal system and secure (insecure) property rights if the legal system and property rights index is 
greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. The last row 
reports the p-value for the test of difference in the coefficients on COL×HLEV between the low and high 
subsamples. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Appendix A Variable definitions and data sources 
 
Variable Definition Source: 
Authors’ 
calculations 
based on 
Panel A. Hofstede's cultural indices 
SALES_G Sales growth equals (SALESt – SALESt-1)/SALESt-1. This variable is adjusted relative 
to its country-industry-year means. 
Compustat 
EMPLOYEE_G Annual percentage employee (EMP) growth rate of equals (EMPt – EMPt-1)/ EMPt-
1, where EMP is the number of employees. This variable is adjusted relative to its 
country-industry-year means. 
As above 
AP_G Annual percentage growth rate of account payable (AP) equals (APt – APt-1)/ APt-1. 
This variable is adjusted relative to its country-industry-year means. 
As above 
Panel B. Hofstede's cultural indices   
COL Collectivism, equals 100 minus Hofstede’s cultural index on individualism (IDV). Hofstede 
(2001) 
UAI Hofstede’s cultural index on uncertainty avoidance. As above 
MAS Hofstede’s cultural index on masculinity. As above 
PDI Hofstede’s cultural index on power distance. As above 
Panel C. High leverage variables   
HLEV Dummy variable equal to one in a given year if the firm’s leverage ratio (long term 
debt/total assets) is in the top three deciles in the country in which the firm is 
headquartered, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
Panel D. Control variables 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets expressed in U.S. dollars. This variable is adjusted 
relative to its country-industry-year mean. 
As above 
PROFIT Profitability equals (operating earnings + depreciation)/total assets. This variable 
is adjusted relative to its country-industry-year mean. 
As above 
INVESTMENT Investment equals capital expenditures/total assets. This variable is adjusted 
relative to its country-industry-year mean. 
As above 
SELLEXP Sell expenses equal the sum of advertising and selling expenses/total sales. This 
variable is adjusted relative to its country-industry-year mean. 
 
DEVELOPED Dummy variable equal to 1 if a country is classified as a developed economy, and 
0 otherwise. 
World 
Economic 
Situation and 
Prospects by 
United Nations 
GDPG Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. WDI 
INFLATION Annual inflation rate. As above 
LEGAL Strength of a country’s legal regime computed following the methodology of 
Durnev and Kim’s (2005) as the product of the revised anti-director rights index 
(Djankov et al., 2008) and the law and order index (ICRG). 
Djankov et al. 
(2008) and 
ICRG  
INDUSTRY DISTRESS Dummy set to one for industry-years with negative mean sales growth and mean 
stock returns below -30%, and 0 otherwise. 
Compustat 
LOG(SALE) Natural logarithm of total sales expressed in U.S. dollars. This variable is adjusted 
relative to its country-industry-year mean. 
As above 
PROFITABILITY Profitability equals operating earnings/total assets. This variable is adjusted relative 
to its country-industry-year mean. 
As above 
ASSET SALE Asset sale equals asset sales/total assets. This variable is adjusted relative to its 
country-industry-year mean. 
As above 
Panel E. Other variables used in the baseline, subsample, endogeneity, and robustness tests 
 
Product Specialization A firm is classified as having high (low) product specialization if its R&D-to-sales 
ratio is above (below) the sample median two years before the base year. 
As above 
Industry Debt Level An industry is classified as financially unhealthy (healthy) industry if the industry 
average long-term debt ratio is greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the 
overall sample two years before the base year. The long-term debt ratio equals long 
term debt/total assets. 
As above 
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STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENT Stock market capitalization to GDP. World Bank’s 
Financial 
Development 
and Structure 
dataset 
VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Degree to which a country’s citizens perceive themselves as being able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom 
of association, and free media. 
WGI 
(Kaufmann et 
al., 2010) 
POLITICAL STABILITY Likelihood that the government is perceived to be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, e.g., politically motivated violence and 
terrorism. 
As above 
CONTROL OF CORRUPTION Perceptions of the degree to which public power is exercised for private interests, 
including petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by 
elites. 
As above 
GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS Degree to which government effectiveness is perceived, including the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service, and the degree of its independence 
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
As above 
ECONOMIC FREEDOM Country’s overall economic freedom score, ranging from 0 to 100, with a higher 
score indicating that a country is more economically free. Individuals in an 
economically free society would be free and entitled to work, produce, consume, 
and invest in any way they pleased under a rule of law, with their freedom at once 
both protected and respected by the state. 
EFW 
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT Level of government expenditures (including consumption and transfers) as a 
percentage of GDP, ranging from 0 to 100, with lower values reflecting a higher 
level of government expenditure. 
As above 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT Extent to which countries use private investment and enterprises rather than 
government investment and firms to direct resources. 
As above 
Labor Intensity An industry is classified as a high (low) labor intensity industry in a given year if 
it has a wage-to-capital ratio greater than (less than or equal to) the median of all 
industries two years before the base year. Wage-to-capital ratio equals total staff 
expenses/net property, plant, and equipment. 
Compustat 
Employee Relation Policy A firm is defined as having an employee relations policy if it describes, claims to 
have, or mentions the processes in place to improve its labor-union relations. 
ASSET4 
Supplier Relation Policy A firm is defined as having a supplier relations policy if it describes, claims to have, 
or mentions the processes in place to improve its partnerships with suppliers and 
contractors. 
As above 
Law and Order Index assessing the strength of the legal system, and the extent to which the citizens 
of a country are willing to rely on the established institutions to make and 
implement laws and adjudicate disputes. This time-varying index ranges from 0 to 
6, with a higher score indicating stronger political institutions and court system, as 
well as popular observance of the law. 
ICRG 
Legal System and Property Rights Index assessing the quality of the legal system and the security of property rights. 
This time-varying index has 9 subcomponents: judicial independence, impartial 
courts, protection of property rights, military interference in rule of law and politics, 
integrity of the legal system, legal enforcement of contracts, regulatory restrictions 
on the sale of real property, reliability of police, business costs of crime. Higher 
score on the index means better legal system and more secure property rights. 
Fraser 
Institute’s EFW 
(2012) 
COL_TK Updated collectivism, equals 100 minus Tang and Koveos’ updated cultural index 
on individualism. 
Tang and 
Koveos (2008) 
COL_INST  GLOBE’s cultural index on should-be institutional collectivism. House et al. 
(2004) 
FFC Natural logarithm of the Four-Firm concentration ratio, which captures the total 
market share of the four largest firms in an industry. 
Compustat 
HHI Natural logarithm the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, which captures the degree of 
market concentration in an industry. 
As above 
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Internet Appendix for 
“Collectivism and the Costs of High Leverage” 
 
Table IA1. Replicating Table 2 using Standard Errors Clustered by Country  
 Baseline Model Top 3 Deciles Top 1 Decile 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 
 
0.028** 0.041* 
  
 
(2.52) (1.80) 
COLc 
 
-0.002 -0.007 
  
 
(-0.11) (-0.23) 
HLEVt-2 -0.011*** -0.040** -0.081** 
  (-6.17) (-2.42) (-2.45) 
SIZEt  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 
  (6.75) (6.91) (5.42) 
PROFITt-1  0.134*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 
  (9.94) (10.36) (5.95) 
PROFITt-2  -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 
  (-1.32) (-1.11) (-1.45) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.276*** 0.276*** 0.289*** 
  (5.53) (5.57) (4.49) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.157*** 0.155*** 0.129*** 
  (5.46) (5.59) (3.01) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.003 0.003 0.006 
  (0.59) (0.57) (0.96) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.022*** 0.021*** 0.015** 
  (2.75) (2.84) (2.49) 
DEVELOPEDc×HLEVt-2  0.017** 0.021 
   (2.16) (1.46) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.010 -0.012 -0.001 
  (-1.16) (-1.30) (-0.05) 
GDPGc,t×HLEVt-2  0.001 0.002 
   (0.83) (1.14) 
GDPGc,t -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-0.93) (-0.94) (-1.43) 
INFLATIONc,t×HLEVt-2  0.002*** 0.005** 
   (3.05) (2.53) 
INFLATIONc,t 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.57) (0.05) (-0.32) 
LEGALc×HLEVt-2  -0.000 0.000 
   (-0.19) (0.27) 
LEGALc 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.14) (0.19) (-0.84) 
CONSTANT 0.004 0.007 0.042 
  (0.23) (0.39) (1.41) 
N 241,906 241,906 73,205 
R2 0.015 0.016 0.017 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which 
is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism (COL), high leverage 
(HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed descriptions of variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
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Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement 
method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other 
firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. Model 1 presents results for Equation (1) on the 
costs of high leverage. Model 2 presents results for Equation (2) on the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage. Model 
3 repeats Model 2 using a more extreme definition of high leverage that assigns a value of one to the top decile firm-year 
observations and a value of zero to the bottom decile observations. Comparisons based on this definition are between extremely 
high-leveraged firms and extremely low-leveraged firms. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 
country level. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007493 
58 
 
Table IA2. Replicating Table 2 using Standard Errors Clustered by Country and Year 
 Baseline Model Top 3 Deciles Top 1 Decile 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 
 
0.028*** 0.041* 
  
 
(3.18) (1.83) 
COLc 
 
-0.002 -0.007 
  
 
(-0.16) (-0.29) 
HLEVt-2 -0.011*** -0.040*** -0.081*** 
  (-6.78) (-3.47) (-3.39) 
SIZEt  0.009*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 
  (13.67) (13.96) (11.61) 
PROFITt-1  0.134*** 0.135*** 0.104*** 
  (13.61) (13.52) (8.15) 
PROFITt-2  -0.013 -0.013 -0.016 
  (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.34) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.276*** 0.276*** 0.289*** 
  (11.47) (11.50) (7.02) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.157*** 0.155*** 0.129*** 
  (7.94) (7.86) (4.08) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.003 0.003 0.006 
  (0.76) (0.74) (1.31) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.022*** 0.021*** 0.015** 
  (4.16) (4.13) (2.46) 
DEVELOPEDc×HLEVt-2  0.017*** 0.021 
   (2.84) (1.58) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.010 -0.012* -0.001 
  (-1.31) (-1.94) (-0.07) 
GDPGc,t×HLEVt-2  0.001 0.002 
   (0.88) (1.12) 
GDPGc,t -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 
  (-0.97) (-1.02) (-1.44) 
INFLATIONc,t×HLEVt-2  0.002*** 0.005*** 
   (3.57) (3.86) 
INFLATIONc,t 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.51) (0.05) (-0.33) 
LEGALc×HLEVt-2  -0.000 0.000 
   (-0.22) (0.29) 
LEGALc 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  (0.18) (0.24) (-0.98) 
CONSTANT 0.004 0.007 0.042** 
  (0.24) (0.61) (2.38) 
N 241,906 241,906 73,205 
R2 0.015 0.016 0.017 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which 
is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism (COL), high leverage 
(HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed descriptions of variable definitions and data sources are provided in 
Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement 
method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other 
firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. Model 1 presents results for Equation (1) on the 
costs of high leverage. Model 2 presents results for Equation (2) on the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage. Model 
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3 repeats Model 2 using a more extreme definition of high leverage that assigns a value of one to the top decile firm-year 
observations and a value of zero to the bottom decile observations. Comparisons based on this definition are between extremely 
high-leveraged firms and extremely low-leveraged firms. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
country and year. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table IA3. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: Firm fixed effect and propensity score matching 
  Firm Fixed Effect 
(without de-meaning) 
Firm Fixed Effect 
(without de-meaning) 
Propensity Score Matching 
  (1) (2) (3) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.029*** 
  (4.33) (4.08) (3.32) 
COLc   -0.003 
    (-0.45) 
HLEVt-2 -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.036*** 
  (-5.96) (-5.57) (-3.72) 
SIZEt  0.027*** 0.028*** 0.007*** 
  (16.27) (16.44) (12.64) 
PROFITt-1  0.079*** 0.079*** 0.144*** 
  (8.00) (7.90) (12.65) 
PROFITt-2  -0.022** -0.024** -0.030*** 
  (-2.35) (-2.50) (-2.92) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.195*** 0.176*** 0.276*** 
  (10.01) (8.57) (12.38) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.127*** 0.120*** 0.192*** 
  (7.19) (6.43) (10.00) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.056*** 0.056*** -0.007 
  (10.34) (10.27) (-1.17) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (4.83) (4.65) (4.10) 
DEVELOPEDc×HLEVt-2 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 
  (4.22) (3.99) (3.49) 
DEVELOPEDc   -0.015*** 
    (-3.41) 
GDPGc,t×HLEVt-2 0.001* 0.001** -0.000 
  (1.67) (2.00) (-0.37) 
GDPGc,t -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001* 
  (-3.77) (-3.79) (-1.93) 
INFLATIONc,t×HLEVt-2 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (3.92) (2.92) (2.75) 
INFLATIONc,t 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 
  (3.39) (3.39) (1.22) 
LEGALc×HLEVt-2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (1.06) (1.28) (-0.39) 
LEGALc 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.000 
  (9.49) (9.55) (0.61) 
CONSTANT -0.296*** -0.303*** 0.004 
  (-18.52) (-18.63) (0.58) 
N 241,906 224,156 141,068 
R2 0.011 0.011 0.016 
This table reports results from estimating firm fixed effect models and using propensity score matching. The dependent variable is 
SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for 
collectivism (COL), high leverage (HLEV), and firm- and country-level controls. Detailed descriptions of variable definitions and 
data sources are provided in Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we 
use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its 
country peers. Models 1 and 2 report the firm fixed effect results. We keep all variables unadjusted (without de-meaning). Model 
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1 includes all firm observations. Model 2 includes only firms that have experienced changes in high leverage status over the sample 
period. Model 3 reports propensity score matching results. In Model 3, firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-
industry-year means. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table IA4. Robustness check: sample composition and alternative measures 
  COLc×HLEVt-2 COLc 
 (1) (2) 
Panel A. Sample Composition 
(1) Exclude U.S. 0.046*** -0.042***  
(4.10) (-6.09) 
(2) Exclude Japan 0.026** -0.004  
(2.25) (-0.62) 
(3) Exclude Japan & U.S. 0.049*** -0.061***  
(3.22) (-6.52) 
(4) Weighted Regression 0.035*** 0.004  
(4.02) (0.70) 
Panel B. Alternative Proxy for High Leverage 
(5) Lag Three Years 0.013** 0.018***  
(2.13) (3.12) 
Panel C. Alternative Proxies for Collectivism 
(6) COL_TK (Updated Hofstede by Tang and Koveos, 2008) 0.016** 0.045***  
(2.17) (5.55) 
(7) COL_INST (Globe) 0.007* 0.000 
  (1.77) (0.10) 
This table reports results from a series of robustness tests. Only coefficients of COL×HLEV and COL are reported for 
brevity. In Panel A, we re-estimate our baseline regressions (Equation (2)) after excluding U.S. firms (Row 1), 
Japanese firms (Row 2), and firms from both countries (Row 3). In addition, we run a weighted regression in which 
each country is assigned a weight equal to the reciprocal of its number of observations (Row 4). In Panel B, the 
robustness test employs an alternative proxy for high leverage. In Panel C, the robustness tests employ alternative 
proxies for collectivism. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table IA5. Robustness check: firm exit bias 
Mean Rate of Firm Exit Bankruptcy Merger Others All 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Split by High Leverage 
[1] Yes   0.33% 2.97% 2.11% 5.41% 
[2] No   0.22% 2.93% 1.71% 4.86% 
Panel B. Split by Collectivism 
[3] High   0.08% 1.27% 1.00% 2.35% 
[4] Low   0.56% 6.00% 3.34% 9.90% 
[1]-[2] p-value of difference between High and Low Leverage Sample 
     0.000***     0.159  0.000***  0.000*** 
[3]-[4] p-value of difference between High and Low Collectivism   
     0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   0.000*** 
This table reports the mean rate of firm exit due to reasons documented in Compustat Global data item DLRSN 
(Reason for deletion). Mean rate of Bankruptcy is the proportion of firm-year observations that exit Compustat because 
of bankruptcy or liquidation (DLRSN=02 or 03). Mean rate of Merger is the proportion of firm-year observations that 
exit Compustat because of acquisition or merger (DLRSN=01). Mean rate of Others is the proportion of firm-year 
observations that exit Compustat for reasons other than bankruptcy or merger (DLRSN=04-07, 09 or 10). Mean rate 
of All is the proportion of firm-year observations that exit Compustat for reasons listed in Models 1 to 3 (DLRSN=01-
07, 09 or 10). Panel A presents the mean rate of firm exit split by high leverage. A firm is assigned to the high (low) 
leverage subsample if HLEV=1 (0) two years before the base year. Panel B presents the mean rate of firm exit split by 
high and low collectivism samples. Countries with high (low) collectivism have a collectivism score above (below or 
equal to) the median of the overall sample. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3007493 
64 
 
Table IA6. Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: Market structure explanation 
  (1) (2) 
COL×HLEVt-2 0.028*** 0.029***  
(3.75) (3.78) 
COL -0.003 -0.002  
(-0.58) (-0.45) 
FFCt-2×HLEVt-2 -0.003 
 
 
(-0.49) 
 
FFCt-2 0.009** 
 
 
(2.48) 
 
HHIt-2×HLEVt-2 
 
-0.006   
(-0.63) 
HHIt-2 
 
-0.002   
(-0.36) 
HLEVt-2 -0.039*** -0.039***  
(-4.42) (-4.69) 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 241,906 241,906 
R2 0.016 0.016 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equation (2) and further controls for market structure variables and their 
interactions with HLEV. The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers 
and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism (COL), high leverage (HLEV), and 
firm- and country-level controls. FFC is the natural logarithm of the Four-Firm concentration ratio, which is the total 
market share of the four largest firms in an industry. HHI is the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, 
which captures the degree of market concentration in an industry. Detailed descriptions of variable definitions and 
data sources are provided in Appendix A. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 
2006), we use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is 
measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-
industry-year means. Model 1 additionally controls for FFC and its interaction with HLEV. Model 2 additionally 
controls for HHI and its interaction with HLEV. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm level.  ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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